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The Constraints of the Past and the Failure of  
Central Asian Regionalism, 1991–2004
Damian Rosset and David Svarin
This article examines the failure of regional integration in post-Soviet Central 
Asia. It proposes a narrative of the rise and fall of Central Asian regionalism 
between 1991 and 2004 centered on the perceptions and expectations of the 
region’s republics. The argument is that these states did not emerge from the 
USSR in an ideational vacuum, where their construction of self at the inter-
national level was to be defined from scratch. Rather, the Central Asian elites 
inherited pre-existing understandings of the role and place of their respective 
state in the new international system. At the regional level, an actual and a 
perceived set of power relations led to incompatible preferences and strategies, 
thus making it impossible to find common ground for Central Asian region-
alism.
Introduction
The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 propelled the five Central Asian So-
viet republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan, into independence. These five states did not exist in their current form 
prior to being constituent republics of the Soviet Union and as a consequence 
they had to find ways to integrate and position themselves within the interna-
tional state system. At a meeting in Tashkent in January 1993, the presidents 
of the five republics1 declared that they would from now on recognize them-
selves under the designation “Central Asia,”2 as opposed to their Soviet label 
Sredniaia Aziia i Kazakhstan (literally, “Middle Asia and Kazakhstan”). This 
declaration carried enormous weight: “to those gathered it was a statement of 
unity, an explicit declaration that the five states now shared a common fate.”3 
The statement could also be interpreted as a strategy to move away from the 
1 Tajikistan was represented by the chairman of the parliament.
2 Martha Brill Olcott, “The Myth of ‘Tsentral’naia Aziia’,” Orbis 38, no. 4 (1994): 549.
3 Ibid.
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Russian sphere of influence but—more importantly—it defined and presented 
to the world the region formed by these five states as a unitary entity with clear 
boundaries, insiders, and outsiders.
The mindset of the five Central Asian republics (CARs) was predominantly 
determined by their common Soviet past. Even though the Soviet Union did 
not exist anymore as of 1991, its economic, political, cultural, and social links 
were very much alive. As a result, it seemed logical that the five CARs would 
undertake efforts to build regional organizations and institutions that would 
regulate their interactions. Indeed, between 1991 and 2004 a number of region-
al organizations of different nature, both excluding and including outside ac-
tors, were founded, reformed, merged, and dismantled. After 2004, however, 
only regional organizations including at least one country external to Central 
Asia still existed. 
In this article, we discuss the failure of Central Asian regionalism in the 
years following their independence and trace it back to the Soviet legacy. Not-
withstanding the positive feelings and good intentions coming out of the Tash-
kent meeting in January 1993, the common Soviet past was actually an obstacle 
to regionalism in Central Asia.
When speaking of Central Asian regionalism we primarily refer to regional 
institutional integration among the five CARs.4 In this article, however, we ex-
clude Turkmenistan from the discussion because the country followed a firmly 
isolationist path and “has set itself apart from the phenomenon of regionalism 
altogether.”5 Adopting a strategy of “permanent positive neutrality,” Turk-
menistan did not become a member of any regional organization in Central 
Asia and in fact the entire post-Soviet space (after being a full member at first, 
since 2005 it has only been an associate member of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS)).
When the five CARs gained independent statehood, they became new ac-
tors in the international system and, as such, needed to define their respective 
place in this system. We argue that the states of post-Soviet Central Asia did 
not emerge from the USSR in an ideational vacuum, where their construction 
of self at the international level was to be defined from scratch. Rather, the 
Central Asian elites inherited pre-existing norms and beliefs regarding the role 
and place of their respective states in the new international system. The struc-
ture inherited from the Soviet Union provided the CARs with both an actual 
and a perceived set of power relations. 
We aim to show that the Soviet experience provided the CARs with a 
framework of interpretation, as well as a set of preferences, regarding in-
4 In our analysis, we do not focus specifically on economic cooperation and trade 
links between the CARs. For this, the work of Libman and Vinokurov is particu-
larly instructive. See Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov, “Is It Really Dif-
ferent? Patterns of Regionalization in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” Post-Communist 
Economies 23, no. 4 (2011): 469–92.
5 Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Order,” Inter-
national Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 485.
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ter-state hierarchy in the region and that these preferences—incompatible with 
one another—have hindered the development of regional integration. In order 
to do so, we need, first, to define what we mean by power relationships and 
hierarchy and, second, to introduce the framework for assessing the causality 
between preferences towards hierarchy and regionalism.
This article proceeds as follows: the next section lays out the theoretical 
framework; we apply Hurrell’s four different categories of how hegemony 
may act as a powerful stimulus to regionalism and to the creation of regional-
ist institutions to the Central Asian case.6 Thereafter, following a look back at 
the Soviet period, we propose a narrative of the rise and fall of Central Asian 
regionalism between 1991 and 2004 centered on the perceptions and expecta-
tions of the CARs.7
The Hierarchy-Regionalism Nexus
According to the neorealist approach to international relations, “the parts of 
a hierarchic system are related to one another in ways that are determined 
both by their functional differentiation and by the extent of their capabilities.”8 
Since states are “functionally undifferentiated” units, the international system 
is anarchic.9 This paper takes another stance: it considers that when a state 
possesses the security and economic capabilities to constrain another state’s 
behaviour, there is a situation of relational hierarchy (even if the surrounding 
system is anarchic). This understanding is tangential to the conception of he-
gemony. A relatively ill-defined concept,10 hegemony deals with domination 
of a group over another, and thus with de facto hierarchy. 
For the purpose of this article, two definitions of hegemony are useful. 
First, hegemony is “the leadership of one state (the hegemon) over other states 
in the system.”11 Second, hegemony represents a situation where “one state is 
powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations 
and is willing to do so.”12 A hegemon is thus a state with both the capabili-
6 Andrew Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” in Regionalism in World 
Politics: Regional Organization and the International Order, ed. Louise Fawcett and 
Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 37–73.
7 The ambition of this article is thus not to analyse new primary data, but rather to 
present an original and convincing explanatory interpretation of historical events.
8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 97.
9 Ibid.
10 Miriam Prys, “Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional 
Powerhood,” International Studies Review 12, no. 4 (2010): 482.
11 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 116.
12 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Longman, 2001), 44. It is no coincidence that we draw on the same definitions as 
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ties (in terms of economic and security power) and the will to dominate oth-
er states. The existence of a hegemon, and thus of hierarchy, does not imply 
strict determinism in the patterns of relationships between the hegemon and 
the states under its hegemony. Hierarchy can be partial and is evolutionary. 
Between extremes of “Westphalian sovereignty” and “Imperial dominion,” 
“there are many intermediate forms, … including spheres of influence and 
economic zones, in which the dominant state prohibits subordinates from al-
lying or exchanging with other potential great powers, and protectorates and 
economic dependencies, where the dominant state regulates broad areas of 
security or economic policy, respectively.”13 Moreover, hegemony, as de facto 
hierarchy, does not imply that the smaller states necessarily accept this hier-
archy and subordinate to the hegemon. Therefore, this article deals with the 
way they perceive the hegemony or hegemonic ambitions of other states and, 
crucially, how they relate to it. Most importantly, the existence of more than 
one hegemon can provide smaller states with more or less desirable options in 
terms of hierarchy.
The study of regionalism has been concerned with the role of hierarchical 
relations as drivers of or hindrances to regional cooperation.14 This dual per-
spective on regional integration is also brought forward by Amitav Acharya in 
his observation that, although “power matters,” “how regions resist and/or so-
cialize powers is at least as important a part of the story as how powers create 
and manage regions.”15 The role and impact of hegemony on the formation of 
regional orders is thus a key component. This article examines regionalism in 
Central Asia using Andrew Hurrell’s categorization, according to which there 
are “at least four ways in which hegemony may act as a powerful stimulus to 
regionalism and to the creation of regionalist institutions.”16
First, regionalism can emerge as “a response to the existence of an actual or 
potential hegemonic power.”17 Acharya refers to such responses as strategies 
of “exclusion… whereby regional coalitions of weaker states or minor powers 
may cooperate to reduce the scope for intrusion by stronger powers in their 
Ruth Deyermond in her article on “Matrioshka hegemony.” Indeed, we define he-
gemony in line with her multi-level hegemony model, where hegemons in smaller 
groups of states coexist with hegemons of greater importance. See Ruth Deyer-
mond, “Matrioshka Hegemony? Multi-Leveled Hegemonic Competition and Se-
curity in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 
151–73.
13 David A. Lake, “Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order,” 
Review of International Studies 35, no. S1 (2009): 39.
14 Prys, “Hegemony, Domination, Detachment.”
15 Amitav Acharya, “The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics,” World 
Politics 59, no. 4 (2007): 630.
16 Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” 50.
17 Ibid.
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region’s affairs.”18 Such endeavors follow the expectation that weaker states 
seek to balance the relative power of stronger states.
A second way hegemony can promote regionalism is as “an attempt to re-
strict the free exercise of hegemonic power.”19 Such a “rule-constrained hege-
monic order” can be preferable to the states that have to deal with the regional-
ism-hegemony dilemma. Indeed, they allow trading the acceptance of some of 
the hegemon’s demands for the positive externalities of the cooperation with 
a hegemon. Because they are more acceptable to the hegemon, such efforts to 
“pursue socialization/binding strategies directed at both outside and region-
al powers” are also “relatively more successful” than attempts to exclude the 
hegemon.20
Third, regionalism can develop as an endeavor of weaker states to accom-
modate the regional hegemon to benefit from the positive externalities it pro-
vides—“bandwagoning in the realist jargon.”21 This type of behavior is similar 
to the second one—it is also a “rule-constrained hegemonic order”—but puts 
less emphasis on the constraining aspects of regionalism on the hegemon and 
more on the positive externalities that bandwagoning states obtain. According 
to the neorealist approach, such behavior is expected when power differentials 
are huge, particularly because states balance “threats” rather than “power.”22
Finally, regionalism can emerge under the hegemon’s conduct.23 Thomas 
Pedersen called this phenomenon “co-operative hegemony” and proposed to 
approach it from the perspective of the hegemon’s prospects. In his theory 
“regional institutionalization is seen as typically the product of a grand strat-
egy pursued by comparatively weak or declining big powers.”24 Institution-
alized cooperation is unnecessary, if not counterproductive to very dominant 
hegemons, which can maximize their benefits in bilateral relationships. In a 
situation of declining hegemony, however, the hegemon might be pressed “to-
wards the creation of common institutions to pursue its interests, to share bur-
dens, to solve common problems, and to generate international support and 
legitimacy for its policies.”25
These four possible interactions of hegemony-regionalism relationships 
offer a framework to understand the alternatives faced by the Central Asian 
states. However, while the systemic nature of this approach offers an under-
standing of the various possible alternatives offered to the decision-makers, 
18 Acharya, “Emerging Regional Architecture,” 647.
19 Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” 50.
20 Acharya, “Emerging Regional Architecture,” 648.
21 Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” 51.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 52.
24 Thomas Pedersen, “Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in Re-
gional Integration,” Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002): 678.
25 Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” 52.
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one needs to focus on the state level to understand how and why they prefer 
a specific option rather than another. This article argues that Central Asian 
regionalism has failed because the CARs have developed incompatible prefer-
ences towards regional integration. It identifies how the CARs have perceived 
regionalism and traces the origins of these perceptions to the Soviet experi-
ence. Perceptions influence how decision-makers understand their environ-
ment. They shape the expectations towards and the understanding of other 
actors’ behavior, as well as their own choice of action.26 The following chapter 
engages in a chronological narrative of the failure of regionalism in Central 
Asia, looking specifically at the perception patterns within the region and the 
resulting expectations towards regionalism.
The Failure of Central Asian Regionalism
Three distinct periods, running from 1991 to 2004, are defined in order to facil-
itate the subsequent discussion. We start with a look back at the Soviet period. 
Then we examine the period 1991 to 1997, which starts with the troubled early 
years of independence and ends with the conclusion of the Tajik civil war in 
May 1997. The second period, ranging from 1997 to 2001, is the period of con-
solidation with regard to Central Asian regionalism. The final period, from 
2001 to 2004, can be called the internationalization of Central Asia since the 
region was rediscovered by the outside world as a consequence of the events 
of 9/11 and the ensuing global “war on terror.” The end point of this study is 
the moment when Russia becomes a member of the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO) in October 2004, thus marking the end of the last purely 
Central Asian regional organization.27
We argue that the CARs had incompatible expectations regarding re-
gionalism: while Uzbekistan considered it worthy only if it were to assume 
a leading role, the remaining republics found regional cooperation under the 
domination of Tashkent unacceptable. This was fuelled by the perception that 
Uzbekistan was the natural hegemon in Central Asia and that the other states 
preferred to subordinate to Russia.28
In the Central Asian context, hegemonic aspirations have been attributed 
to two states—Russia and Uzbekistan. Russia has been termed a “declining he-
26 Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings, eds., Kosovo: Perceptions of War and Its After-
math (London: Continuum, 2001), 3.
27 An overview of all the mentioned regional organizations in Central Asia can be 
found in Table 1. The list includes organizations that are either composed solely 
by CARs or by CARs and Russia.
28 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia”; Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional 
Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 27, no. 2 
(2008): 185–202.
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gemon” with regard to the post-Soviet space generally,29 and to Central Asia in 
particular.30 The calamitous economic situation of the early 1990s drove Russia 
to focus on internal matters rather than searching external dominance. The is-
sue of Russia’s role in its neighborhood was controversial among the Russian 
elite,31 as well as outside Russia. In practice, Russia expressed no ambition to 
play the role of hegemon in Central Asia. However, the conflicts in Tajikistan 
and Georgia highlighted Russia’s crucial role in the region as a guarantor of 
security,32 not least because, even in a situation of decline, it still enjoyed “lo-
cally formidable” capabilities.33 Economically too, the Russian disengagement 
from Central Asia did not lead to a situation where the CARs could function 
without Russia. Therefore, when the Kremlin renewed its interest in the region 
in the mid-1990s,34 it still had the economic, security, and cultural attributes to 
be considered a regional hegemon. As such, “Russia [dominated] its neighbor-
hood and [regulated] potential conflict between itself and its subordinates and 
between other dyads in the region.”35
Uzbekistan’s hegemony in Central Asia is “aspirational rather than real-
ized,”36 but has been widely noted as a constant issue in post-Soviet Central 
Asia.37 The idea of Uzbekistan’s leadership in the region had a long history. 
Tashkent had already been the capital of the Tsarist “General Governorate of 
Turkestan”38 and when the Bolsheviks took power, they “did not make a secret 
of their plans for Uzbekistan as the dominant regional power.”39 Mikhail Kali-
29 William C. Wohlforth, “Revisiting the Balance of Power in Central Eurasia,” in Bal-
ance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, 
and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 214–38.
30 Deyermond, “Matrioshka Hegemony?”
31 Mikhail Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance: Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the 
Post-Soviet Era, 1992–1997 (London: Greenwood Press, 1999).
32 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt, “Possibilities for Conflict and Conflict Reso-
lution in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State 
Building, ed. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London: Routledge, 1998), 103.
33 Wohlforth, “Revisiting the Balance of Power,” 214.
34 Lena Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007); Deyer-
mond, “Matrioshka hegemony?” 160.
35 Lake, “Regional hierarchy,” 55.
36 Deyermond, “Matrioshka Hegemony?,” 162.
37 Anna Zelkina, “Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genu-
ine is the Islamic Threat?,” Religion, State, & Society 27, nos. 3–4 (1999): 356–72; Eric 
A. Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and 
Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” Security Studies 
14, no. 2 (2005): 325–63.
38 Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Thierry Kellner, “Moyen-Orient, Caucase, et Asie 
centrale: Des concepts géopolitiques à construire et à reconstruire?,” Central Asian 
Survey 19, no. 1 (2000): 125.
39 Zelkina, “Islam and Security,” 359.
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nin, the nominal head of state of the USSR, declared in 1925 that “Uzbekistan 
must play a large role in Central Asia, a role, one might even say, of hege-
mony.… You [leaders of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan] must relate to 
them [the rest of Central Asia] as Moscow relates to you.”40 The Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republic (SSR) was the most important republic in the region, as well 
as the most independent from Moscow in its management.41
The central role of the Uzbek SSR in Central Asia was primarily felt in 
Tajikistan, which had been created as an Autonomous SSR within the Uzbek 
SSR in 1924 and only gained the status of Union republic in October 1929. Both 
before and after this date, the relationships between the two entities have been 
controversial, not least due to the main centers of Tajik culture, Bukhara and 
Samarkand, being left outside Tajikistan. There was and is a feeling in Tajik-
istan that Uzbekistan aims to deny the nationhood of Tajiks since the 1920s. 
Indeed, Uzbekistan, “maintained a ‘big brother’ attitude towards Tajikistan… 
and was encouraged [by Moscow] to do so.”42 The situation of the Tajik mi-
nority in Uzbekistan was also a contentious issue, particularly after the devel-
opment of Uzbek nationalism in the 1960s, and Tashkent largely ignored the 
Tajiks’ demands for minority rights.43 
Kyrgyzstan shared with Tajikistan a Soviet experience marked by an ex-
treme dependence on the center to ensure both economic stability and securi-
ty. The intervention of the Soviet army in the inter-ethnic riots between Kyrgyz 
and Uzbek residents of the southern cities of Osh and Uzgen in 1990 served as 
a reminder of this reality. For that matter, Moscow was hardly conceived as a 
historical enemy in Kyrgyz historiography, but rather as a benevolent patron 
or even an ally.44 This lack of historical antagonism towards Russia was similar 
in Kazakhstan. While Russia conquered the khanates of Khiva and Kokand, 
as well as the emirate of Bukhara manu militari, its presence in the Kazakh 
steppes initially resulted from the request for assistance by the Kazakh Lesser 
and Great Hordes against the Kalmyks in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies.45 
The Kazakh SSR’s whole economic structure was integrated into the one 
of Russia—not only through the interdependence of industrial plants, but also 
40 Quoted in Donald S. Carlisle, “Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and 
its Neighbours,” in Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, ed. Yaacov Ro’i (London: 
Frank Cass, 1995), 77.
41 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations (New York: 
New York University Press, 2000).
42 Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia, 112.
43 Neil Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road (Amsterdam: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 50.
44 Robert Lowe, “Nation Building and Identity in the Kyrgyz Republic,” in Central 
Asia: Aspects of Transition, ed. Tom Everett-Heath (London: Routledge, 2003), 107.
45 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 195–251.
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for “energy grids and supply lines [that] traditionally ran north-south rather 
than east-west.”46 The economies of both republics were developed in a “single 
economic complex.”47 Moreover, Kazakhstan’s Soviet experience provided it 
with an uncomfortable ethnic balance: by 1989, ethnic Kazakhs represented 
39.5% of the country’s population, while the “Russian-speakers” (Russians, 
Belarusians, Ukrainians, Russified Germans) were a majority.
In the USSR, Kazakhstan was not considered a part of Central Asia, but a 
distinct entity: the region was referred to as “Middle Asia and Kazakhstan.”48 
The Bolsheviks used this terminology to replace the Tsarist Turkestan they con-
sidered a potentially dangerous potential tool for nationalist mobilization.49 
However, although Kazakhstan was not formally a part of Central Asia, these 
five republics were often treated as a whole on the basis of their ethnographic 
and cultural likeness, “a fact generally recognized by Soviet writers.”50
This very brief discussion of the CARs’ historical experience during the 
Soviet period with reference to the prevailing hegemonic order serves as back-
drop to the subsequent discussion of Central Asian regionalism in the post-So-
viet era. The respective perception of the self and the hierarchical position 
of the other CARs in the Soviet Union had an impact on the willingness and 
political decisions with regard to regional initiatives and attempts at regional 
integration.
1991–97: The Troubled Years of Independence 
The unprepared independence into which the CARs were “catapulted”51 
forced them to define their regional policies. However, the isolationist path 
46 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, DC: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 2002), 10.
47 Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance, 67.
48 It is noteworthy that at times in Soviet history there have been plans to integrate 
the economies of the four Middle Asian SSRs. However, these plans materialized 
only for eighteen months with the existence of the “Central Asian Economic Re-
gion” between February 1963 and December 1964. See Ian Murray Matley, “Indus-
trialization (1865–1964),” in Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, a Histori-
cal Overview, ed. Edward Allworth, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1994), 337.
49 Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l’Empire 
russe: Bukhara 1867–1924 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), 272.
50 Geoffroy Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (London: Weidenfelf 
and Nicolson, 1964), 1. For example, the the Muftiyya of Tashkent (head office of 
religious affairs) had competency over the five SSRs. See Roy, The New Central Asia, 
1.
51 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence,” Foreign Affairs 71, 
no. 3 (1992): 108–30.
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chosen by Turkmenistan as well as the Tajik civil war blocked the prospects for 
regional cooperation during this period.
In the context of Russian disengagement from the region in the first half 
of the 1990s, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan defined clear objectives regarding 
regionalism, while Kyrgyzstan played a limited role due to its weak situation. 
Uzbekistan “could afford to play the independence card much sooner and 
much more wildly” than Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, because it was “geopoliti-
cally removed from Russia and with a small Russian minority.”52 In the region-
al context, Tashkent inherited both the material potential and the ideational 
motivations to become an “instinctive imperialist.”53 Uzbekistan’s will to im-
pose itself as the main regional power was primarily observable in its policies 
towards its smaller neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tashkent pressured 
Bishkek by withholding its shipment of natural gas when Kyrgyzstan unilater-
ally left the ruble zone in 1993, conducting military and intelligence operations 
on Kyrgyz territory and declaring its responsibility towards the large Uzbek 
population of Southern Kyrgyzstan.54 However, it is primarily the Tajik civil 
war that allowed it to claim the role of “policeman of Central Asia,” recog-
nized by both Russia55 and the West.56 The Tajik civil war pushed Uzbekistan 
to develop a military capacity much earlier and broader than its Central Asian 
neighbors.57 Most importantly, it defined Tashkent’s approach to hierarchy in 
the region. Indeed, while the Uzbekistani and Russian forces cooperated close-
ly during the first year of the war, since mid-1993 Uzbekistan distanced itself 
from Emomali Rakhmonov, the Russia-supported governmental side’s leader. 
Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov feared the increasing political isolation 
of the traditionally ruling Uzbek minority from northern Tajikistan and started 
supporting this “third force” against the government in the conflict. Accord-
ingly, it turned into a “rival to Russia in Central Asia” trying to restrict the 
latter’s hegemony in the region.58
In this context, Uzbekistan signed a free-trade agreement with Kazakh-
stan that became the CAEC when Kyrgyzstan joined the two countries in April 
52 Sally N. Cummings, “Happier Bedfellows? Russia and Central Asia under Putin,” 
Asian Affairs 32, no. 2 (2001): 144.
53 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Re-
gional Security (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 113.
54 Annette Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998), 50.
55 Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 54.
56 Mahiaddin Mesbahi, “Regional and Global Powers in Central Asia,” in The Making 
of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Adeed Dawisha and 
Karen Dawisha (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 224.
57 Gregory Gleason, “Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence,” in New 
States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 591.
58 Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia, 54.
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1994. The institutionalization of Central Asia was a statement of unity, a unity 
that Tashkent considered as both shielding against Russian domination and 
inevitably centered on itself. As Annette Bohr puts it, “most initiatives for Cen-
tral Asian integration [in the 1990s] have come from the Uzbekistani leader-
ship, and have been accompanied by the underlying message that the region 
should unify around the Tashkent metropolis.”59 Meanwhile, Tashkent’s poli-
cy towards Eurasian regional structures, mainly the CIS but also the Eurasian 
Union (EAU) project led by the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev,60 
aimed at preventing them from becoming instruments of Russian hegemonic 
reassertion. 
Concomitantly, Nazarbayev, “the most enthusiastic defender of a revital-
ization of the USSR,”61 was advocating economic integration in the disinte-
grating post-Soviet space. He promoted a strong CIS that would reintegrate 
the post-Soviet space. At a meeting in Minsk in April 1994, he went as far as 
proposing a project for not only economic, but also political integration in the 
framework of the EAU.62 Nazarbayev believed integration with Russia would 
not only ensure the endurance of economic and security ties on which it de-
pended, but would also constrain Russian hegemonic aspirations “by entan-
gling it in the coils of consensual, multilateral decision-making.”63 He made 
the opposite calculation to Karimov who saw such institutions as a smoke-
screen for Russian reassertion.64 
While advocating for the EAU, Kazakhstan also promoted Central Asian 
regionalism. Still within the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev invited the leaders of 
the four Central Asian SSRs to Alma Ata to discuss common issues on 23 June 
1990, “less than a fortnight after [Russia] declared its sovereignty.”65 The fol-
lowing year, the five leaders met in Tashkent, and then in Ashgabat, to coor-
dinate their reaction to the decisions taken in Minsk by the three Slavic re-
publics.66 Arguably, this advocacy for Central Asian cooperation was coherent 
with the main concept of Kazakhstani foreign policy, namely “multi-vector 
politics,” where the country is open to cooperation with any other country, 
59 Bohr, Uzbekistan, 51.
60 Not to be confused with the Eurasian Union project proposed and outlined by 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in a newspaper article in 2011 and implemented 
in a first step as the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014.
61 Olcott, Central Asia’s New States, 10.
62 Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance, 168.
63 Menon and Spruyt, “Possibilities for Conflict and Conflict Resolution,” 112.
64 Bohr, Uzbekistan, 43–44.
65 Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance, 32.
66 Romain Yakemtchouk, Ouzbékistan: Puissance émergente en Asie centrale (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2003), 100–1.
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choosing on every matter the partner that maximizes its self-interest.67 It rep-
resented both a response to Russian dealings with Belarus and Ukraine, which 
were leaving Kazakhstan aside, and a primary occurrence of “external” coop-
eration without the supervision of Russia.68 
1997–2001: The Consolidation Period
After the troubled post-independence years, the second half of the 1990s was 
characterized by the establishment of a number of regional organizations (see 
Table 1 on p. 260). In addition, some important developments changed the dy-
namics in Central Asia: in May 1997 the Civil War in Tajikistan came to an end; 
Russia’s interest and involvement in Central Asia grew bigger; and there was a 
surge in Kazakhstan’s power, thus limiting Uzbekistan’s hegemonic position. 
During the later years of the 1990s, Uzbekistan adopted a double strategy 
in Central Asia. On the one hand it tried to constrain Russia’s influence in the 
region and, on the other hand, it positioned itself as the regional hegemon. 
In a 1995 speech in the Uzbekistani parliament, Karimov called for a move-
ment “Turkestan our common home” and asked “How long are we going to 
keep silent, to be afraid of someone… of a Big Brother, how long?”69 Uzbeki-
stan also started to criticize the CIS of which it was a full, albeit somewhat 
passive, member for being a vehicle of Russian interest. In 1999, Karimov ac-
cused Russia of “trying to impose its will on CIS countries” and stated that all 
matters were “dictated by Russia.”70 Tashkent opted out from the Russian-led 
Collective Security Treaty (CST) when the Treaty was to be renewed in early 
1999 and joined the GUAM (acronym for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and 
Moldova), an alliance of CIS countries willing to limit Russia’s influence in 
the post-Soviet space.71 With regard to Central Asia, Uzbekistan, while being 
challenged by Kazakhstan, tried to hang on to its position as regional hege-
mon by demonstrating force: “Since 1999 Uzbekistan has enforced a rigorous 
visa regime, mined its border regions, expelled residents from border areas, 
unilaterally demarcated certain border territories and regularly cut off energy 
supplies to its neighbors.”72
67 Reuel R. Hanks, “‘Multi-Vector Politics’ and Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role as a 
Geo-Strategic Player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, 
no. 3 (2009): 259–61.
68 Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional Perspec-
tives,” Central Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (2002): 168.
69 Quoted in Anthony Hyman, “Turkestan and Pan-Turkism Revisited,” Central 
Asian Survey 16, no. 3 (1997): 349.
70 Miller and Toritsyn, “Bringing the Leader Back In,” 355.
71 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 488.
72 Ibid., 495.
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In reaction to Uzbek attempts at regional domination, the strategy of Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan was to contain Uzbekistan by moving 
closer to Russia and by becoming members of all regional organizations that 
included Russia. In 1996, Kazakhstan joined the Customs Union between Rus-
sia and Belarus. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan remained a close ally to Russia in re-
gional structures, agreeing to all Russian propositions in the CIS and joining 
both the “Shanghai Five” (comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and Tajik-
istan) and the Customs Union of Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan in 1996.73 
Tajikistan remained mainly a passive member in regional institutions until it 
emerged from its civil war in 1997, but from then on President Rakhmonov 
has been an enthusiastic regionalist. He attempted “to carve out a niche” for 
himself “as an active promoter of security cooperation within the Russian-led 
CST,”74 hoping to raise his prestige in Moscow. Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s role 
in the Tajik civil war increased Tajikistan’s suspicion towards its large neigh-
bor and prompted Dushanbe to align even closer with the Russian hegemon. 
In 1998, Tajikistan joined the Customs Unions of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Kyrgyzstan, which in October 2000 was renamed the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEc). 
Interestingly, Uzbekistan changed strategy towards the end of the 1990s 
from trying to limit Russian influence to benefiting from it. There are several 
reasons for Tashkent’s foreign policy realignment in 1999. First, the change of 
leadership in the Kremlin indicated a renewed Russian policy towards Central 
Asia and Uzbekistan.75 Second, the seemingly rising terrorist threat pushed the 
Uzbek leadership to seek additional security guarantees.76 Third, a lack of hard 
currencies forced Uzbekistan to reorientate its foreign trade towards the CIS.77 
In this context, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five in June 2001 prompting 
the organization to rename itself Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
This structure satisfied Tashkent because Chinese membership was effectively 
“neutralizing” the influence of Russia.78 At the beginning of the 21st century, 
only one exclusively Central Asian regional institution, CACO, remained. 
73 Sébastien Peyrouse, Anne-Gabrielle Castagnet, Arnaud Ruffier, Olivier Roy, and 
Catherine Poujol, République kirghize: Bilans annuels de 1993 à 2010 (Paris: La Décou-
verte, 2010).
74 Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia, 52.
75 Cummings, “Happier Bedfellows?”; Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia.
76 Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia.
77 Robert Legvold, “Introduction: Great Power Stakes in Central Asia,” in Thinking 
Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus, ed. Robert 
Legvold (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 20–21.
78 Allison, “Virtual Regionalism,” 195.
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2001–4: The Internationalization of Central Asia
The third period starts with 9/11 and the increased international interest and 
active engagement of the United States (US) in the countries of Central Asia, 
especially in the context of the “war on terror.” One could not categorize the 
US as a regional hegemon, but due to its nature as global hegemon and in ac-
cordance with the “Matrioshka hegemony” model,79 it enters the framework 
of hegemonic competition by changing the dynamics in the region. Hence, 
US activism in Central Asia and its alliance with Uzbekistan triggered fears 
among the other CARs about Uzbek hegemony80 because US cooperation with 
Uzbekistan effectively embraced the latter as the regional hegemon.81
Whereas the previous years were characterized by varying approaches to 
regionalism, the early 2000s witnessed a much more homogenous approach 
by the CARs. At first, the US appeared to be a generous partner in terms of 
financial assistance, especially for Uzbekistan, and Tashkent believed the US 
could also replace Moscow as a security partner. In October 2002, Uzbekistan 
refused to join the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
which replaced the CST. Kazakhstan also joined the US-led alliance in the “war 
on terror,” primarily as a means to raise its status vis-à-vis Russia and more 
broadly on the international scene, especially since it was increasingly consid-
ered to be dispossessing Tashkent from its regional leadership. The optimistic 
mood in the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan prompted Ta-
jikistan to diversify its external contacts and diminish its dependency on Rus-
sia and Uzbekistan. Dushanbe saw new opportunities to open up the country’s 
infrastructure by building new bridges to Afghanistan, but also new roads to 
Kyrgyzstan and China.82 Similarly, Kyrgyzstan cooperated with the US-led 
operation in Afghanistan, accepting to lease the Manas military base to the US. 
In the end, however, US hegemony in Central Asia remained short-lived. 
Kyrgyzstan’s motive for assuring basing rights to the US was actually its des-
perate need for financial assistance rather than an attempt to move away from 
Russia. On the contrary, Bishkek offered Russia the use of the Kant airbase, 
only 35 kilometres away from Manas, in October 2003.83 Furthermore, the very 
close Uzbek-US relationship cooled down quickly due to diverging views on 
political processes in the region. The 2003–4 “color revolutions” in Georgia 
and Ukraine raised concerns among Central Asian elites, and particularly in 
Uzbekistan where American NGOs and politicians were increasingly critical 
79 Deyermond, “Matrioshka Hegemony?”
80 Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Keeping Central Asia Stable,” Third World Quarterly 25, 
no. 4 (2004): 702–3.
81 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New Friends, New Fears in Central 
Asia,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (2002): 61–62.
82 Sébastien Peyrouse, Anne-Gabrielle Castagnet, Arnaud Ruffier, and Olivier Roy, 
République du Tajikistan: Bilans annuels de 1993 à 2010 (Paris: La Découverte, 2010).
83 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 491.
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of Tashkent’s human rights record.84 Russia was also irritated by US policies in 
the region and started signaling its readiness to enter in less intrusive security 
relations with Uzbekistan.85 The cooling relations with the US, culminating in 
the harsh criticism by the US of the Uzbekistani security forces’ management 
of the Andijan crisis in 2005,86 accompanied by warming relations with Russia 
led to concrete outcomes in regional cooperation: Russia became a member 
of CACO in May 2004 and in May 2005 Uzbekistan withdrew de jure from 
GUUAM, from which it was de facto absent since 2002.87 
Not every country in Central Asia reacted with the same enthusiasm to 
greater Russian influence. While Karimov endorsed Russian involvement with 
the words “We regard Russia not simply as a donor on realizing economic 
projects, but also as a guarantor in solving those conflict situations which may 
arise between us. Russia always, at all times had been a power which settled 
many problems,”88 Nazarbayev reacted to the abolishment of the last region-
al structure excluding Russia with a new proposition, namely the “Central 
Asian Union” (CAU). Addressing “the People of Kazakhstan” in February 
2005, he declared: “In the region, we share economic interests, cultural heri-
tage, language, religion, and environmental challenges, face common external 
threats.… We should direct our efforts towards closer economic integration, 
a common market, and a single currency.”89 Notwithstanding Kazakhstan’s 
efforts at building stable regional structures, the opposite actually happened; 
in September 2005, CACO merged with EurAsEC and in October 2005 Uzbeki-
stan became a member. Although this was a logical step after Russia’s entry 
into CACO,90 it also allowed Russia to claim that it had “effectively taken con-
trol over the integration processes in the region.”91 By the mid-2000s, there no 
longer was a purely Central Asian regional organization and relations between 
84 David Lewis, The Temptations of Tyranny in Central Asia (London: Hurst, 2008), 42–
46.
85 Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in 
International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 38.
86 Lewis, The Temptations of Tyranny, 216.
87 Richard Pomfret, “Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Economic Change and Re-
structuring 42, no. 1–2 (2009): 61, fn. 21.
88 Quoted in Marat Yermukanov, “Will Russia Help Diffuse Kazakh-Uzbek Ten-
sion?,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 5, no. 20 (2004): 14–16.
89 Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, “Address of the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to the People of Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan on the Road to Accelerated 
Economic, Social, and Political Modernization,” 18 February 2005, Official Site of 
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at http://www.akorda.kz/en/
page/page_address-of-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-
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the CARs took place bilaterally or seemed to be regulated under the eyes of 
Russia. Or, as Farkhad Tolipov put it in 2005, “as a quasi-political structure 
and an institutionalized region, Central Asia no longer exists.”92 
Table 1. Selected Regional Organizations in Central Asia
Name Foundation Members
Commonwealth of  
Independent States
1991 Former Soviet Republics (except 
Baltic States from 1993 onwards)
Central Asian Economic 
Union (CAEU)
1994 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeki-
stan, Tajikistan (since 1998)
Collective Security Treaty  
Organization (CSTO, former-
ly Collective Security Treaty)
1992; 2002 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan (left 1999, rejoined in 2006) 
Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO,  
formerly CAEU)
1994; 2002 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Russia (since 2004)
Eurasian Economic  
Community (EurAsEc)
1994 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan (since 1996), Tajikistan 
(since 1999), Uzbekistan (since 2006)
Shanghai Cooperation  
Organization (formerly 
Shanghai Five)
1996; 2001 Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (since 
2001)
Georgia, Ukraine, (Uzbeki-
stan) Azerbaijan, Moldova 
(GUAM, later GUUAM)
1997; 1999 Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (from 
1999 to 2005), Azerbaijan, Moldova
Source: Kathleen Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authori-
tarian Regimes: The Case of Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 2 (2009): 265–66.
Explaining the Failure of Central Asian Regionalism
The narrative in the previous section has demonstrated that in the years fol-
lowing their independence, the CARs adopted a variety of strategies in con-
straining, bandwagoning, and benefiting from the regional hegemons. There 
is a great fluctuation in their respective perceptions and the hierarchical posi-
tion of each country in Central Asia with regard to the regional hegemon and 
the other CARs. Kazakhstan’s ambiguity towards both Russia and the oth-
er CARs, Kyrgyzstan’s deferent relation to Russia, Tajikistan’s fear of Uzbek 
domination as well as Uzbekistan’s self-perception as a regional power can 
92 Farkhad Tolipov, “CACO Merges with EEC: The Third Strike on Central Asia’s 
Independence,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 6, no. 20 (2005): 9.
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all be traced back at least to the history of national delimitations in the 1920s 
and the Soviet experience more generally. These representations provided the 
leaders of Central Asia with an image of their relative role in the region and, as 
a result, with a set of preferences and expectations regarding hierarchy. The di-
verse structural situations of the four republics under scrutiny since indepen-
dence understood through the prism of their preferences on regional hierarchy 
provide an understanding of their perspectives towards regionalism. In turn, 
the incompatibility of these different perception patterns and the concomitant 
irreconcilable strategies explain the outcomes of regionalism in Central Asia.
The CARs’ perceptions of and expectations towards Eurasian regionalism 
(including Russia) and purely Central Asian regionalism, reveal the diverg-
ing mechanisms at work. Each of the CARs, at different times, adopted differ-
ent approaches to regionalism with relation to Hurrell’s four categories: as a 
means to balance the hegemon; as a tool to contain its hegemonic aspirations; 
as a way to bandwagon with the hegemon; or as a result of and a tool for sus-
tained hegemonic domination.
Kazakhstan was the strongest promoter of Central Asian regionalism, but 
at the same time a strong promoter of Eurasian regionalism. These two settings 
played different roles in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Eurasian regionalism 
aimed primarily at socialising Russia. While Kazakhstan’s approach towards 
Russian hegemony was less confrontational than Uzbekistan’s, Nazarbayev 
was nonetheless willing to restrict Russian influence in Central Asia to some 
extent. Between 1991 and 2004, Kazakhstan shifted between Hurrell’s catego-
ries 2 and 3, from joining all Russian-led initiatives such as the Customs Union 
and EurAsEc to diversifying its alliances by supporting the United States in the 
“war against terror.”
Kazakhstan’s approach to Central Asian regionalism can be categorized 
as balancing against Russia, thus representing category 1. Central Asian re-
gionalism was viewed as a strategy to boost its symbolic position vis-à-vis 
Moscow. However, it can also be claimed that Kazakhstan promoted Central 
Asian regionalism since the turn of the century for another reason. Thanks to 
its increasingly dominant position in Central Asia, resulting from its enhanced 
material capabilities, Astana can claim to replace Uzbekistan as the regional 
hegemon. In this situation, its promotion of Central Asian regionalism corre-
sponds to the fourth of Hurrell’s categories. Interestingly then, Central Asian 
regionalism aims both at dominating the region and balancing against an ex-
ternal hegemon. This constellation, in which a country’s strategy corresponds 
to Hurrell’s categories 1 and 4, is possible only in a situation of multi-level 
hegemony.
Precisely this pattern can also be observed with Uzbekistan’s approach to 
Central Asian regionalism up until the moment when Tashkent no longer is 
in a position to assume regional leadership. During this period, Uzbekistan 
demonstrated force with a number of policies aimed at increasing its position 
in the region. It also aimed at aligning the fellow CARs behind it, in order to 
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constrain Russian hegemony in Central Asia. However, contrarily to Nazarba-
yev, who advocated for Central Asian regionalism even before he was in a 
position to dominate it, Karimov lost interest in regional integration when he 
could no longer lead it. In other words, balancing Russia was more important 
to Kazakhstan than dominating Central Asia, while regional domination was 
more important to Uzbekistan than balancing the outer hegemon. This reveals 
the diverging perception patterns of the CARs: while Uzbekistan considered 
itself a natural regional hegemon, Kazakhstan evaluated its position in the re-
gion with regard to Russia—captured between a sense of vulnerability and the 
ambition to elevate its status in relation to Russia.
As far as Eurasian regionalism is concerned, Tashkent can be located in 
the second category during most of the period under study. Indeed, it always 
tried to limit the influence of regional organizations that included Russia, as 
well as Russia’s influence within these organizations. Hence, Tashkent joined 
some of these organizations hoping to socialize Russia. For example, it opted 
out from the CST and later refused to join the CSTO as it considered the orga-
nization’s structure to be giving too much power to Russia. Instead, it joined 
GUAM, another organization whose goal was to balance Russia. This policy 
rarely changed. However, in the late 1990s and following the first “color rev-
olution” in Georgia, Russia’s dominance appeared less problematic and Tash-
kent aligned more closely with Moscow, falling at times into category 3. This 
last rapprochement eventually resulted in the death of Central Asian regional-
ism, as it led Russia to join CACO in 2004.
Regional integration looked rather different from the viewpoint of Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan due to their relative weak material capabilities and strong 
external dependency. Both countries joined most of the regional organizations 
at the Central Asian and Eurasian levels. Both sought the benefits from band-
wagoning with Russia in Eurasian regional structures. They needed the secu-
rity assistance and economic ties provided by the hegemon to maintain their 
statehood. Arguably, the fear of Uzbekistan gave an even bigger incentive to 
such behavior, particularly in the case of Tajikistan. They viewed close coop-
eration with Russia as an indispensable factor for their survival and as an in-
strument to contain Uzbekistani aspirations. In terms of Eurasian regionalism, 
both countries therefore fall in the third of Hurrell’s categories as they clearly 
bandwagoned with Russia.
The vulnerability of both states to Uzbekistani economic and military pow-
er led the two countries to participate in Central Asian regional organizations. 
They saw these structures as opportunities to socialize and bind Tashkent, or 
at least to dilute its supremacy in bilateral relations. This strategy thus corre-
sponds to category 2. However, the experience of fruitless Central Asian insti-
tutions seems to have hampered their confidence in those institutions’ effec-
tiveness to achieve that goal.
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The Post-2004 Period
Obviously, history does not end in 2004 and the relationships between the 
CARs, as well as with Russia, have been fluctuating since then and will contin-
ue to do so. While actively participating in all Eurasian regional organizations, 
Nursultan Nazarabyev has promoted, at the Central Asian level, the project of 
an EU-modelled Central Asian Union. However, due mainly to Uzbekistan’s 
rejection of this project, no concrete steps have been reached towards its reali-
zation. At the Eurasian level, the past decade has mainly witnessed the institu-
tionalization of the CSTO and the SCO, as well as the creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Union in 2014 under Russian leadership. Kazakhstan already signed 
the treaty, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are reported to have an interest 
in joining. This organization, aimed at creating a single economic market, is 
the brainchild of Russian President Vladimir Putin and thus considered to be 
primarily a means for Russia to institutionally embed its dominance in the 
post-Soviet region.93 
As mentioned earlier, the year 2004 was a turning point in the relationship 
between Tashkent and Moscow, bringing them closer together, thus impact-
ing on Uzbekistan’s approach to regionalism. The Andijan events in 2005 and 
the stir they created helped accelerate this process, which culminated in June 
2006 when Uzbekistan joined the CSTO. However, this honeymoon did not 
last long as Tashkent feared Russia’s preponderant position in the region. Uz-
bekistan suspended its membership in EurAsEC in October 2008 arguing that 
it was ineffective in solving the disagreement over water management in the 
region. It had, anyway, refused to implement the organization’s treaties on 
border control and economic integration. Tashkent also left the CSTO in June 
2012 after having missed several of the organization’s meetings since 2009. 
Already before, Uzbekistan was a rather reluctant member in the organization, 
objecting to the establishment of a joint CSTO force in 2008 and a Collective 
Rapid Reaction Force in 2009.
Interestingly, the two states most vulnerable to Uzbekistan’s hegemonic as-
piration, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have used the very platform of the CSTO 
to put forward a railway project that would circumvent Uzbekistan. As Joshua 
Kucera comments: “it would be an interesting development if the organization 
turned into a forum for the smaller Central Asian governments to band togeth-
er against Uzbekistan’s heavyhand regional influence.”94 Kyrgyzstan chaired 
the CSTO in 2013 and it seems that the 2010 regime change did not affect its 
policy in favor of regional integration at both the Eurasian and Central Asian 
levels. This is particularly noteworthy since regional organizations have been 
93 See, for example, Hannes Adomeit, “Putin’s ‘Eurasian Union’: Russia’s Integration 
Project and Policies on Post-Soviet Space,” Neighbourhood Policy Paper, no. 4 (2012).
94 Joshua Kucera, “At CSTO Summit, Varying Views On Regional Security,” Eur-
asianet, 29 May 2013, available at www.eurasianet.org/print/67036, accessed on 7 June 
2013.
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reluctant to take sides during the April 2010 overthrow of Bakiev or to respond 
to the transition government’s calls for assistance during the ethnic riots in 
southern Kyrgyzstan in June of the same year.95
Tashkent’s reluctance to Nazarbayev’s project of the CAU can also be in-
terpreted according to our model, since the growing gap between Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, to the benefit of the former, renders Tashkent skeptical of a 
renewed Central Asian regionalism. Considering this disparity, such an en-
deavor would necessarily displace the regional leadership from Tashkent to 
Astana.96 Uzbekistan’s recent policy of increasing isolation reflects the same 
considerations as the policy of regional domination in the 1990s and the policy 
of reliance on the West in the first years of the new century: Tashkent is only 
interested in Central Asian regionalism under its own domination and refuses 
it when an another actor becomes more powerful. 
In the post-2004 period, the only regional organizations with a real pros-
pect at fostering cooperation among the CARs have been organizations involv-
ing at least one country or institution external to the region. This provokes 
the question whether the idea of Central Asia as a region is still relevant and 
whether regional integration in Central Asia is not at a dead end. It seems that 
Central Asian integration today merely functions as part of a wider Eurasian 
integration.97 
Conclusion
The attitudes of the CARs towards Eurasian and Central Asian regionalism 
seem to have been strongly influenced by the respective images of self shaped 
by the emergence to statehood and reinforced during the years following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. These perceptions provided the leaders with 
a representation of each state’s place in the region and a set of preferences 
regarding regional hierarchy. The incompatibility of these perspectives led to 
diverging strategies regarding Central Asian regionalism. 
While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan looked for the positive economic and 
security-related externalities resulting from regionalism with the Russian he-
gemon, Kazakhstan primarily aimed to dilute the power of that hegemon in 
regional structures. Nevertheless, from the Kazakhstani perspective, a real 
break-up with Russia was unthinkable and, hence, Kazakhstan’s promotion of 
95 Alexander Cooley, “The Kyrgyz Crisis and the Political Logic of Central Asia’s 
Weak Regional Security Organizations,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 140 
(2011).
96 Allison, “Virtual Regionalism,” 192.
97 Libman and Vinokurov, “Is It Really Different?,” 486; see also Johannes F. Linn, 
“Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?,” in Eur-
asian Integration Yearbook 2012, ed. Evgeny Vinokurov (Almaty: Eurasian Develop-
ment Bank, 2012), 96–117.
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Central Asian regionalism must be understood as a means to balance Russia. 
In addition, from Astana’s viewpoint, Central Asian regionalism increasingly 
appeared like an important platform from which it could raise its status on the 
international scene as the leader of a region. Furthermore, it is true that Ka-
zakhstan, to some extent, but particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, viewed 
close cooperation with Russia as an indispensable factor for their survival and 
an instrument to contain Uzbekistani aspirations. From Tashkent’s viewpoint, 
a Central Asian regionalism was only desirable if it aimed to withstand Russia 
and allowed itself to exert regional hegemony. 
Consequently, it seems fair to say that, because Central Asian regionalism 
under Uzbek hegemony was unacceptable to the remaining three republics, 
Uzbekistan’s challenge to Russian hegemony and its own hegemonic aspira-
tions have been significant hindrances to more effective regionalism in Central 
Asia. Furthermore, again we are able to observe how the socialization of each 
of the CARs during the Soviet period influenced its policy choices following in-
dependence. As such, Uzbekistan, which politically was at the center of Soviet 
Central Asia, tried to retain this position, while Kazakhstan was eager to build 
new regional structures to better integrate the region. Hence, the perception 
pattern in each of the CARs—reflecting their respective Soviet experience—led 
them to choose different approaches and diverging strategies with respect to 
regional cooperation and the hierarchy-regionalism nexus in Central Asia.
In general, the importance of the political elites in shaping Central Asian 
regionalism should not be neglected. Indeed, the political regimes of the CARs 
had and still have a very tight grip on political developments and prevent 
almost any kind of social organization. This can be seen as an additional fac-
tor inhibiting stronger regional links in the region: “The personalist regimes 
of Central Asia have impeded the emergence of the more diversified type of 
regionalization that would be created by interactions between NGOs, private 
traders, migrant labor, and other types of independent social and business 
networks. This so-called “soft” regionalism relies on the existence of a diver-
sity of independent civil society organizations and transnational substate net-
works which have not been allowed to flourish in Central Asia.”98 As a result, 
transnational networks are relatively weak and the few non-state transnational 
movements are kept outside of the decision-making process. Since indepen-
dence, the state has remained the uncontested political actor in Central Asia 
and thus a state-centric approach in analyzing regionalism in Central Asia 
seems adequate.
In fact, the political elites are one of the most enduring legacies of the So-
viet system. There is continuity in political life across Central Asia today, as 
relatively little change has occurred since 1991. Furthermore, “Regime preser-
vation has encouraged the pursuit of state interests but has primarily discour-
aged the pooling of sovereignty out of fear that an outside power will encroach 
98 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 499–500.
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upon their policy-making.”99 The preservation of the current political elites 
and the continuity of their political strategies can be considered a major im-
pediment to regionalism in Central Asia,100 and it is also in this sense that the 
Soviet legacy can be seen as a limiting factor. The transcontinental links and 
general integration across Eurasia might be beneficial to the CARs in terms 
of trade and economic opportunities; however, there remain many issues, 
ranging from security to energy and infrastructure, which warrant stronger 
regional cooperation inside Central Asia. Only a change of the current political 
conditions in Central Asia and the rise to power of a truly post-Soviet genera-
tion could help blow away the shadow of the past and prepare the ground for 
Central Asian regionalism.
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